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Abstract
Background: The social health insurance coverage is relatively high in Mongolia; however, escalation of out-of-
pocket payments for health care, which reached 41 % of the total health expenditure in 2011, is a policy concern.
The aim of this study is to analyse the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures and to measure the rate of
impoverishment from health care payments under the social health insurance scheme in Mongolia.
Methods: We used the data from the Household Socio-Economic Survey 2012, conducted by the National
Statistical Office of Mongolia. Catastrophic health expenditures are defined an excess of out-of-pocket payments for
health care at the various thresholds for household total expenditure (capacity to pay). For an estimate of the
impoverishment effect, the national and The Wold Bank poverty lines are used.
Results: About 5.5 % of total households suffered from catastrophic health expenditures, when the threshold is
10 % of the total household expenditure. At the threshold of 40 % of capacity to pay, 1.1 % of the total household
incurred catastrophic health expenditures. About 20,000 people were forced into poverty due to paying for health
care.
Conclusions: Despite the high coverage of social health insurance, a significant proportion of the population
incurred catastrophic health expenditures and was forced into poverty due to out-of-pocket payments for health
care.
Keywords: Catastrophic health expenditure, Impoverishment, Financial protection, Mongolia
Background
Ensuring financial protection for the population against
the cost of ill-health is one of the fundamental objectives
of the health system [1]. It has been estimated that
approximately 100 million people worldwide are forced
into poverty, and around 150 million people face cata-
strophic expenditure as a consequence of high out-of-
pocket (OOP) payments for health care each year [2].
Additionally, a large number of people abstain from util-
izing health care resources due to the financial costs.
The literature has shown that a higher proportion of
OOP payments of health expenditure is related to a
higher percentage of households that suffer from
catastrophic health expenditures and are forced into pov-
erty [3, 4]. The World Health Report 2010 proposed a
strategy to improve or modify country-specific health
financing systems so as to achieve universal health cover-
age (UHC), which aims to ensure that everyone has access
to comprehensive and health services of acceptable quality
without incurring financial hardship [2]. Furthermore,
UHC has become one of the overarching health targets of
the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030, approved by
the UN General Assembly in September 2015 [5].
As in many other countries, health financing reforms
in Mongolia are guided by the concept of UHC. Before
1990, Mongolia had a centralised health system where
the government was wholly responsible for both health
service delivery and financing. It provided access to uni-
versal “free” health care (i.e. no patient cost-sharing) [6].
However, during the socio-economic transition from a
centrally planned to a market-oriented economy that
started in 1990, health financing reforms aimed to
* Correspondence: javkhlanbayar.d@gmail.com
1Department of Health Policy and Management, School of Public Health,
Mongolian National University of Medical Sciences, Zorig Street, Ulaanbaatar
14210, Mongolia
2Institute of Public Health and Clinical Nutrition, Faculty of Health Sciences,
University of Eastern Finland, Kuopio, Finland
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Dorjdagva et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2016) 15:105 
DOI 10.1186/s12939-016-0395-8
expand funding sources beyond the government budget
[7]. This policy change encouraged household contribu-
tion to health financing through user fee and co-payment
initiatives. At the same time, reforming the health care
financing system with user fees/co-payments needed a
strategy and evidence-based actions where available, so as
to preclude people from incurring financial difficulties due
to the introduction of co-payments.
In 1994, the government of Mongolia successfully in-
troduced a new social health insurance system (SHI)
[8, 9] . The main purpose of SHI introduction and im-
plementation was not only to promote equitable access
to health care through prepayment, i.e. reducing nega-
tive effects of user fee policies, but also to provide
financial protection for the population from excessive
financial hardships, especially for low income and
vulnerable population groups [7, 9]. This policy focus
is still valid, and remains as an issue of priority in
Mongolia’s medium- and long-term health and SHI
development policies [6, 9–12].
Currently, SHI is one of the main sources of health
financing along with the government health budget. As
of 2014, almost the entire population is covered by SHI
and entitled to the same health service benefits regard-
less of their socio-economic characteristics [9].
According to the health insurance law, the insur-
ance premium for employees in public and private
sectors is 4 % of their monthly salaries, which is
shared equally between the employer and employee
The premium for children under 18 years and
students is equal to 1 % of the national minimum
wage per month. For all other groups, the premium
rate is 2 % of the national minimum wage. It is worth
mentioning that the premiums for some vulnerable
and specific groups, including children younger than
age 18, pensioners, mothers caring for new-born chil-
dren up to the age of two, military personnel and
people on low incomes are fully subsidized by the
government [12].
The benefit package offered by SHI includes major
inpatient services at both secondary and tertiary
level hospitals with a patient cost-sharing at around
10 to 15 % and a limited number of outpatient ser-
vices [8, 13]. In addition, SHI covers 50 to 100 % of
the cost of essential medicines prescribed by family
physicians and medical doctors working at the pri-
mary level of health centres [8]. The Government
health budget funds primary health care services pro-
vided through family health centres and soum (district)
health centres; and some specific services including treat-
ment of chronic and infectious diseases provided at sec-
ondary and tertiary level hospitals [8, 13].
In the past, several efforts have been made to assess
the effect of direct out-of-pocket payments on
household income and expenditure. The World Bank
report, based on the Mongolian Household Socio-
Economic Survey (HSES) 2007/2008, stated that the
incidence of catastrophic health expenditure was
3.3 %, when the threshold was set at health expendi-
tures at 40 % or more of non-food expenditure. It
also reported that the rate of impoverishment due to
out-of-pocket payments was 2.5 % [14]. These results
indicated that the incidence of catastrophic health ex-
penditure and impoverishment is smaller in Mongolia
compared to some other developing countries [14].
Other studies found that the poverty rate in
Mongolia has decreased from 35.2 to 27.4 % (between
2008 and 2012) [15, 16]. In the same period, SHI
coverage increased from 83.2 to 98.6 % [17, 18]. Des-
pite these positive trends, our previous studies
showed that the degree of income-related inequalities
in health care utilization increased between 2008 and
2012 [19]. In addition, the poor tended to use pri-
mary health care rather than secondary or tertiary
hospital care, although they had a lower health status
and greater needs [19], i.e. high-income groups re-
ported significantly better health [20]. In contrast,
high-income groups were more likely to bypass pri-
mary health care and directly choose more costly
health services at the higher levels of hospitals or in
the private sector [19]. A referral system has been
built into the health sector; nonetheless, gatekeeping
at primary health care is weak and unnecessary self-
referral to the upper level hospitals is common [18].
Another emerging fact is that the share of OOP
payments in the total health expenditure reached
41 % in 2011 [9]. As the international evidence indi-
cates, when OOP payments exceed 20 % of total
health expenditure, it is difficult to reach UHC, and a
country may need to improve financial protection
policies [3, 21].
Based on these grounds, this paper aims to contribute
to policy discussions by estimating the incidence of cata-
strophic health expenditure and the rate of impoverish-
ment with the latest available household income and
expenditure survey data, and to analyse the overall trends
and effects of SHI on financial protection in Mongolia.
The paper also intends to promote uniform measurement
and regular monitoring of household catastrophic health
expenditure and impoverishment in Mongolia as part of




Data used in this paper was obtained from the HSES
2012 (http://www.1212.mn/en/), conducted by the
National Statistical Office of Mongolia (NSO). The
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HSES is a nationally representative and annually
conducted survey intended to “evaluate and monitor
the income and expenditure of households, update
the basket and weights for consumer price index, and
inputs to the national accounts” [16]. The survey has
three levels of strata, including Ulaanbaatar (the cap-
ital city), aimag (provincial) centres and soum (dis-
trict) centres, and the countryside [16]. The survey
used a standard questionnaire which consisted of a
wide range of questions on household income, ex-
penditure, consumption as well as health care pay-
ments. A total of 12,811 households are included in
the survey. The detailed household characteristics
were described in the HSES 2012 report [16].
Measuring catastrophic health expenditure
Catastrophic health expenditure occurs if OOP
payments for health care exceed a particular threshold
of a household’s resources: income, expenditure or
consumption [22, 23].
However, it is well known that there is a limitation
in using total household expenditure as an indicator
for household resources, considering that low-income
households may have low OOP for health care due to
the fact that the vast majority of resources are spent
on food and basic survival. Thus, if households are
not able to meet catastrophic health payments, we
may underestimate the burden of OOP payments for
health care. A partial solution is to estimate cata-
strophic health expenditure if health care costs ex-
ceeds the chosen threshold of household non-food
expenditure [23]. Household non-food expenditures is
also known as “non-discretionary expenditure” [22] or
“capacity to pay” [24]. It is measured as the difference
between total household expenditure and household
food expenditure. Hereafter, we use the term “capacity
to pay”, and in this paper we use both “total house-
hold expenditure” and “capacity to pay” as living
standard indicators.
If x is the total household expenditure, nf(x) is capacity
to pay, T is OOP payments for health care, z is a given
threshold, and thus a household incurs catastrophic
health expenditure if T/x, or T/nf(x), exceeds z [23].
In the literature commonly used threshold values (z)
are 10 % for total household expenditure and 40 % for
capacity to pay [23]. However, in this paper we also use
additional thresholds in order to investigate potential
consequences and robustness in the interpretations of
the results.
Measuring incidence and intensity of catastrophic
payments
The incidence (H) of catastrophic payments can be
expressed by head count. It is obtained by the
proportion of households that incurred catastrophic pay-






where N is the sample size. E is an indicator such that
Ei = 1 if
Ti
xi
> z, and otherwise zero.
The head count cannot capture the magnitude by
which household OOP payments exceed the given
threshold. While, the catastrophic payments overshoot,
O, denotes the average extent to which health payments
exceeds the chosen threshold for households that in-
curred catastrophic expenditures. The household over-
shoot is estimated as follows [23]:












Briefly, H refers to the incidence of catastrophic
payments, whereas O is the intensity of catastrophic
payments. Both measures, H and O, are insensitive to
the distribution of catastrophic payments. It is evident
that the consequences of catastrophic health expendi-
tures for rich and poor are different. We used
concentration indices, CE and CO, for Ei and Oi, re-
spectively, to measure the distribution of catastrophic
payments in relation to household expenditures. The
concentration indices fall between -1 and +1. Posi-
tive/negative CE indicates the better-off/worse-off are
more likely to exceed the chosen threshold. Analo-
gously, the overshoot is concentrated among the rich/
poor if CO is positive/negative.
The weighted head count and overshoot measures can
easily be estimated as follows [22]:
Hw ¼ H⋅ 1−Ceð Þ ð4Þ
Ow ¼ O⋅ 1−Coð Þ ð5Þ
The weighted head count and overshoot measures
show the impact of OOP when different weights are
given to households depending on expenditure level
[23]. The households with the lowest expenditures are
weighted by 2, and the households with the highest ex-
penditures are weighted by 0, and the weight decreases
with higher household expenditures.
If the concentration index (Ce) is negative, the
weighted head count (Hw) is greater than the head
count (H) [23].
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All of the measures in terms of capacity to pay were
estimated as the replacement of total household expend-
iture, xi, by capacity to pay, nf(xi), in the above indicated
equations.
Health care payments and poverty
A high OOP payment for health care may push house-
holds into poverty. In practice, a number of people who
are forced into poverty by the need to pay for health
services are not included in the national poverty meas-
urement as poor households.
Impoverishment effect of OOP payments for health
care can be obtained by the difference between a poverty
level with the gross of OOP payments (before health
care payments) and a poverty level with the net of OOP
payments (after health care payments). First, we esti-
mated the gross of the health payments poverty ratio
(HPgross). This gives the percentage of the population liv-









gross is equal to 1 if the per capita total expend-
iture of household (yi) is less than the poverty line and
otherwise 0. si denotes the household size and N indi-
cates the number of households in the sample.
The next measure is a gross of health payments
individual-level poverty gap, which is estimated as
follows:
ggrossi ¼ pgrossi PL−yið Þ ð7Þ
PL refers the poverty line. Based on the equation 7,








The net of health payments head count can be esti-
mated by replacing pi
gross with pi
net in the equation 6.
Where pi
net is equal to 1 if the per capita total expend-
iture of the household is less than the poverty line and
The net of the health payments poverty gap is esti-
mated as the replacement of gi
gross by gi
net in the equa-
tion 8 with gi
net = pi
net(PL − yi).
A normalized poverty gap, which enables us to make
international comparisons across countries with different
poverty lines and currency units, is estimated as follows:
NGgross =Ggross/PL
Poverty line
In order to estimate the above-mentioned poverty mea-
sures, a poverty line should be set. We used the
Mongolian national poverty line, which was 118,668
Mongolian tugrik (MNT) per month ($ 201.02 PPP in
2011) in 2012 as defined by the NSO [16]. This poverty
line was estimated based on the cost of minimum food
requirements per person (2100 calories a day) plus some
non-food expenditures.
Second, for international comparisons we also used
the $1.90 (PPP in 2011) per day per person poverty line
defined by the World Bank for international compari-
sons. After adjustment of poverty parity exchange, this




The distributions of health service utilization by ex-
penditure quintiles are shown in Table 1. There were
4062 (29.8 %) households that reported that at least
one member of the household was hospitalized during
the previous year and 15.6 % of the households used
outpatient services at least once in the past month. Re-
sults showed that the richer used both outpatient and
inpatient health services significantly more than did the
poor. The urban households reported more outpatient
use (p < 0.01) than the rural ones. There is no statisti-
cally significant difference (p > 0.05) between inpatient
use in the urban and rural areas.
The distribution of OOP health payments (MNT)
across quintiles is shown in Fig. 1. The mean OOP pay-
ments among the total households was 25,086.5 MNT.
The results indicate that the amount of OOP health pay-
ments increases with the quintile increase, e.g. the OOP
health payments among the richest 20% households
were almost 10 times higher compared to the poorest
20% households. In addition, the level of OOP payments
in the rural areas was significantly smaller than that in
the urban areas.
Table 1 Distribution of health service utilization by expenditure
quintile
Outpatient (N = 2097) Inpatient (N = 4062)
All 15.6 % 29.6 %
Quintile
1 11.2 % P < 0.01 23.2 % P < 0.01
2 13.9 % 26.8 %
3 16.9 % 30.3 %
4 16.9 % 32.2 %
5 19.2 % 35.6 %
Urban 17.0 % P < 0.01 29.8 % P = 0.07
Rural 12.9 % 29.3 %
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Catastrophic health expenditures
The measures of the incidence of catastrophic payments
for health care in Mongolia are shown in Table 2. We
estimated catastrophic payments as a share of the total
household expenditure and capacity to pay, based on
several threshold budget shares.
The incidence of catastrophic head count can be
explained as follows. When the threshold is 5 % of the
total expenditure, 12.1 % of Mongolian households in-
curred catastrophic payments for health care. When we
increase the threshold, the incidence falls. For instance,
1.2 % of Mongolian households spends in excess of
25 % of the total expenditure on health care. Similarly,
as the threshold is raised from 15 to 40 % of capacity to
pay, the incidence of catastrophic head count drops from
7 to 1.1 %.
Table 2 provides information on the rank-weighted
head counts and concentration index for Ei. The re-
sults showed that the rank-weighted head counts are
smaller than the unweighted head ratio at all levels of
thresholds, regardless of whether catastrophic pay-
ments is defined by the total expenditure or capacity
to pay. It indicates that the better-off are more likely
to incur catastrophic payments for health. This was
confirmed by positive concentration indices for the
incidence of catastrophic payments at all thresholds.
Table 3 shows OOP health payments in excess of cata-
strophic payments threshold budget share.
Probably the incidence of catastrophic head count, the
mean overshoot, falls from 0.99 to 0.16 % as the thresh-
old rises from 5 to 25 %. In the last row of Table 3, the
mean positive overshoot (MPO) is provided. It can be
read as those spending more than 15 % of the total cap-
acity to pay on health care payments, who on average
spent 28.68 % (15 + 13.68 %). Those spending more than
40 % of capacity to pay on health care payments on aver-
age spent 55.05 %. On the other hand, the mean over-
shoot among those exceeding the threshold need is
raised as the threshold increases.
Health care payments and poverty
Poverty measures corresponding to household expendi-
tures both before and after health payments are shown
in Table 4. As mentioned before, we used two poverty
lines in this study, the Mongolian national poverty line
(118,668 MNT) and the World Bank poverty line ($1.90
per day). At the Mongolian national poverty line, the
poverty head count is 22.26 %, i.e. 22.26 % of the Mon-
golian population is estimated to be in poverty using
household expenditures as a living standard indicator.
After accounting for OOP health care payments, a
0.78 % rise in the poverty head count was observed. This
Fig. 1 Distribution of OOP health payments (MNT) across quintile
Table 2 Percentage of households incurring catastrophic payments for health care in Mongolia, 2012
Out-of-pocket health spending as a share of total expenditure As a share of non-food expenditure
Threshold 5 % 10 % 15 % 25 % 15 % 25 % 40 %
Head count 12.1 % 5.5 % 3.3 % 1.2 % 7.0 % 3.4 % 1.1 %
Concentration index, CE 0.03 0.09 0.17 0.32 0.00 0.08 0.29
Rank-weighted head count, HW 11.7 % 5.0 % 2.7 % 0.9 % 7.0 % 3.1 % 0.8 %
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result can be interpreted such that over twenty thousand
people in Mongolia are forced into poverty due to OOP
health care payments. The poverty gap, the average def-
icit to reach the poverty line in the population, also rises
from 6953.57 MNT to 7284.22 MNT. The normalized
poverty gap increased from 5.86 to 6.14 %; however, a
slight rise in the normalized mean positive gap was
found (26.33 to 26.64 %).
Using the World Bank poverty line ($1.90 per day), we
found that both the poverty head count and poverty gap
were much smaller than the results using the Mongolian
national poverty line, which is as expected, given that
the Mongolian national poverty line is much higher than
the World Bank absolute poverty line.
Conclusion and discussion
Measuring and monitoring OOP impact is critical for
countries aiming at UHC. Since there is an increasing
OOP concern, this study using the most recent data pro-
vides new evidence on catastrophic health expenditure
and its impoverishment effect in. In the past, Mongolia
made efforts to estimate OOP impacts by using different
methodologies and thresholds, which made it difficult to
compare and follow-up policy reforms. Some studies es-
timate the impoverishment effects of health care pay-
ments at the individual level using ADePT software, and
some do it at the household level [14, 26]. The method-
ology used in the current study is described in the
World Bank guidelines which are more relevant to
health financing reforms aimed at improving financial
protection [23].
In this study, we estimated the rate of catastrophic
health expenditure and impoverishment due to the OOP
payments for health care using the HSES 2012. The
study reveals several interesting points.
First, 5.5 % of total households suffered from cata-
strophic health expenditures based on an OOP threshold
at 10 % of total household expenditure. At the threshold
of 40 % of capacity to pay, 1.1 % of the total household
incurred catastrophic health expenditures.
Bredenkamp et al. analysed the incidence of cata-
strophic health expenditure in Mongolia using the total
household consumption as the living standard indicator
based on the HSES 2007/2008 data [14]. They found
that the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure
was 10 and 3.3 % at the threshold of 10 % of the total
household expenditure and 40 % of capacity to pay.
Considering the different choices of the living standard
indicator between the studies, we cannot make a direct
comparison between the results. However, it is worth
mentioning that the government of Mongolia provided a
one-time subsidy to the uninsured groups from the Hu-
man Development Fund (a special stabilization fund
from mining revenue) in 2011 [6]
Consequently, between 2008 and 2012 the SHI cover-
age increased from 83.2 to 98.1 %. This implied that spe-
cifically among the poor and vulnerable groups, financial
protection was extended.
Second, to our knowledge, this study provides the first
evidence of intensity of catastrophic health payments in
Mongolia. Intensity of catastrophic health payments was
relatively low, for instance, it was 0.58 % (0.17 %) at the
Table 3 OOP health payments in excess of catastrophic payments threshold budget share in Mongolia, 2012
Out-of-pocket health spending as a share of total expenditure As a share of non-food expenditure
Threshold 5 % 10 % 15 % 25 % 15 % 25 % 40 %
Mean overshoot 0.99 % 0.58 % 0.37 % 0.16 % 0.96 % 0.47 % 0.17 %
Concentration index, CO 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.46 0.14 0.24 0.39
Rank-weighted overshoot, OW 0.95 % 0.53 % 0.31 % 0.11 % 0.96 % 0.43 % 0.12 %
Mean positive overshoot 8.13 % 10.61 % 11.32 % 12.97 % 13.68 % 14.07 % 15.05 %
Table 4 Measures of poverty based on expenditure gross and net of spending on health care, Mongolia 2012










Poverty head count 22.26 % 23.04 % 0.78 % 3.51 % 0.22 % 0.25 % 0.03 % 15.21 %
Poverty gap (MNT) 6953.57 7284.22 330.65 4.76 % 16.56 20.13 3.57 21.55 %
Normalized poverty gap 5.86 % 6.14 % 0.28 % 4.76 % 0.05 % 0.06 % 0.01 % 21.57 %
Normalized mean
positive gap
26.33 % 26.64 % 0.32 % 1.20 % 22.07 % 23.29 % 1.22 % 5.51 %
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threshold of 10 % (40 %) of total household expenditure
(capacity to pay).
Third, the result demonstrates that the richer
households (or households with a higher capacity to
pay) are more likely to incur catastrophic health pay-
ments. Similar results were reported in the World
Bank’s study in Mongolia as well as in other develop-
ing countries [4, 14].
This pattern is likely to be a reflection of the health
system structure in the country. The ADB (2008) re-
ported that the health system has a risk to become a
dual system in where the poor use public facilities and
the rich use private facilities [27].
In a previous study, we found that the poor and low-
income groups were more likely to use primary health
care, regardless of their health needs, which in general
are greater than in higher income groups [19, 20]. This
may be explained by the fact that primary health care is
free of charge and more easily accessible than other
upper level hospitals. Today, nearly the entire population
has SHI coverage regardless of their socio-economic
characteristics; however, the low-income groups are sub-
stantially less likely to access specialized health care ser-
vices at the higher referral levels due to both direct
costs, including co-payments, medicines, consultations,
and indirect costs, such as for transport and meals.
Primary health care centre have a gatekeeping role in
the health sector. In practice, the gatekeeping is weak
and cannot control self-referrals to the upper level hos-
pital admissions [6]. In addition, the SHI covers a larger
part of inpatient services at the upper level hospitals
where the proportion of unnecessary admission is high.
These factors lead to higher OOP payments for
households.
For instance, in order to obtain inpatient services,
the insured person has to pay 10 and 15 % co-
payment for inpatient services at secondary and
tertiary level hospitals. Moreover, a majority of the in-
patients get meals from their home daily. About 40 %
of the inpatients buy drugs and injections themselves
during their hospitalization [28]. The HSES 2009 re-
ported that 71 % of household OOP payments tend
to be made for medications, which were bought from
private pharmacies [6, 15].
Fourth, we found that the poverty head count before
accounting for OOP payments was 22.26 %, which is
lower that the NSO’s estimation (27.4 %) [16]. It can be
explained by a choice of living standard indicator. After
accounting for OOP for health care from household ex-
penditures, the poverty rate increased by 0.78 percentage
points (relative change is 3.51 %). This indicates that
about 20,000 people were forced into poverty due to
paying for health services based on the Mongolian na-
tional poverty line. A similar previous study was
conducted by the World Bank team using the HSES
2007/2008, reported that OOP for health payments in-
creased the poverty head count by 2.5 % and that its
relative change was 7 % [14]. In general, this impoverish-
ment effect of OOP payments for health expenditures is
lower compared to other developing countries, specific-
ally those countries where prepaid health financing
mechanisms is less developed [4, 22, 29, 30].
In accordance with the findings of the study, we
emphasize some potential policy implications. First, in
spite of the developments of financial protection policies
and a high SHI coverage, the country still has barriers to
reaching UHC. Our results suggest that intensity and in-
cidence of catastrophic health expenditure is relatively
low; however, the OOP share of total health expendi-
tures is still 41 %. International and regional evidence
showed that the higher share of OOP expenses, in par-
ticular above 20 %, of total health expenditures in coun-
tries, the more people suffer from catastrophic health
expenditure [3, 21]. Additionally, the current way to re-
port the catastrophic health expenditure and impover-
ishment effect is ad-hoc and is insufficient to support
and sustain UHC. Hence, monitoring progress towards
UHC in Mongolia requires more frequent studies.
Second, the results also demonstrate that rich house-
holds are more likely suffer from catastrophic payments.
In general, they tend to bypass primary health care ser-
vices and seek more expensive upper health care services
with self-referral, regardless of their health needs [19]. In
this scenario, direct and indirect costs are usually much
higher for users owing to the current weak gatekeeping
system.
Hence, a more effective referral system may be benefi-
cial, including stronger gatekeeping, at the primary
health care level of the health sector. It would not only
reduce households’ risk of incurring catastrophic OOP
payments for health expenditures, but it would also lead
the health sector to better efficiency. For instance, the
WHO concluded that primary health care is essential for
better health outcomes of those health care systems, in
which primary health care plays a main role in i) provid-
ing balanced preventive and promotive services regard-
ing the social determinants, and ii) a referral service to
higher level of hospitals [31].
Third, it is difficult to control cost escalation and
unnecessary treatments in the health sector without
improving the regulation of the private health sector,
including hospitals and pharmacies. The growth of
the private health sector with a weak regulation in
the country leads to the unmet health needs among
the population and increases duplications of health
services in the private and public sectors [9, 27].
Fourth, in 2011, the SHI coverage reached 98.6 % as
a result of a one-time subsidy from mining revenues,
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which was a political promise during the parliament
election. Hence, keeping the current high SHI cover-
age is a vital issue for the future financial protection
of the poor and workers in the informal sector.
Importantly, a recent study showed that high SHI
coverage alone (breadth) cannot lead to UHC and im-
prove financial protection in the country [9]. There is a
need of policy actions to improve other dimensions of
UHC, including health service coverage (depth) and cost
coverage (height).
Additionally, it is known that people sell their
apartments or borrow money from others in order to
afford some specific and expensive health care ser-
vices regardless of the SHI coverage in the country.
In this case, intensity of catastrophic health expend-
iture and impoverishment is much deeper among cer-
tain specific groups. Thus, we emphasize that the
HSES questionnaire should be extended with ques-
tions which focus on how people make health care
payments, for example, from either savings or by
loan, etc. Further studies aiming to acquire this infor-
mation will provide more specific policy messages to
the decision makers.
Finally, we should note the limitations of this study.
The study did not address the distribution or struc-
ture of catastrophic health expenditures and its pov-
erty effect. It may call for further studies in this field.
In addition, it is a cross-sectional study, thus unable
to make a causal analysis.
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